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Avionics	  Overview:	  Relevant	  Test	  Objec>ves	  
• Primary	  Objec7ves	  
AC01p. 	  Demonstrate	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  LAS	  to	  propel	  the	  CM	  to	  a	  safe	  distance	  from	  
a	  launch	  vehicle	  during	  a	  pad	  abort.	  
S01p.	   	  Demonstrate	  abort	  event	  sequencing	  from	  abort	  ini7a7on	  through	  LAS	  jeOson.	  
AC03p. 	  Demonstrate	  ground-­‐ini7ated	  abort.	  
DS02p. 	  Demonstrate	  stability	  and	  control	  characteris7cs	  of	  the	  LAV	  due	  to	  the	  LAS.	  
P02p. 	  Demonstrate	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  LAS	  to	  jeOson	  from	  the	  CM.	  
P01p. 	  Determine	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  abort	  motor.	  
P04p. 	  Determine	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  ACM.	  
S07p.	   	  Demonstrate	  jeOson	  of	  the	  forward	  bay	  cover.	  
S09p.	   	  Obtain	  data	  on	  ground	  impact	  loca7ons	  for	  LAV	  modules	  and	  elements.	  
• Secondary	  Objec7ves	  
R01s. 	  Demonstrate	  parachute	  assembly	  system	  event	  sequencing.	  
R02s. 	  Demonstrate	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  drogue	  parachute	  system.	  
R03s. 	  Obtain	  data	  on	  performance	  of	  the	  drogue	  system.	  
R04s. 	  Demonstrate	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  main	  parachute	  pilot	  chute.	  
R05s. 	  Demonstrate	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  main	  parachute	  system.	  

















































































































CM BUS HARNESSES 
ROUTED IN FWD BAY CM BUS HARNESSES 
ROUTED IN FWD BAY 































































CM    LAS 
LINEAR ACCEL, LINEAR & ANGULAR VELOCITY, POSITION, 
ATTITUDE (ROLL, PITCH & TRUE HEADING), ATTITUDE RATE, 
INERTIAL ALTITUDE, AND BODY ANGULAR RATES 
FT-RIU2 FT-VMC2 FT-RIU2 
ACM CONTROLLERS ACT ON THE LATEST VALID 




CM    LAS 
PRIMARY FT-SIGI  DATA USED BY BOTH FT-VMCs IF 
PRIMARY FT-SIGI DATA IS VALID 
 PRIMARY FT-VMC COMMANDS ARE PASSED ON TO ACM 
CONTROLLER VIA BOTH FT-RIUs 























































































•  PA-1 large angle of attack knowledge error; 
attributed to design of PA-1 orientation  
•  Environmental testing resulted in vertical 
velocity and altitude errors which affected 
angle of attack 
•  Tests at high steady g in vertical channel plus 
random vibration saturated sensors 
•  Solution: Mount SIGI with diagonal axis 
vertical. Instead of 19 g on a single vertical 
channel, 11 g will be sensed by all 3 channel  
zoriginal (along CM structure 



























































BaLery	  Cycle	  Life	  /	  Recharge	  Logis>cs	  
•  Vendor	  recommended	  charging	  algorithm:	  Charge	  at	  7.5	  A	  un7l	  baWery	  
terminal	  voltage	  reaches	  38V,	  then	  reduce	  current	  limit	  to	  2.0	  A	  un7l	  
terminal	  voltage	  reaches	  38V	  again	  
•  Two	  baWery	  charging	  tests	  conducted;	  resulted	  in	  algorithm	  bypassing	  high	  
current	  charge	  and	  entering	  top-­‐oﬀ	  phase	  immediately	  
•  Addi7onal	  tests	  and	  consulta7on	  with	  EaglePicher	  concluded	  that	  a	  period	  of	  
inac7vity	  produced	  a	  passiva7on	  layer,	  and,	  combined	  with	  the	  high	  state	  of	  
charge	  (SOC),	  resulted	  in	  an	  elevated	  charging	  terminal	  voltage.	  
Solu>on:	  
•  To	  avoid	  charging,	  developed	  go/no-­‐go	  SOC	  criteria	  of	  25%	  (25AH;	  200%	  
es7mated	  usage	  for	  day	  of	  ﬂight).	  Equates	  to	  approx	  4	  scrubs	  before	  the	  
baWeries	  need	  to	  be	  recharged	  in	  addi7on	  to	  planned	  pre-­‐launch	  tests	  
–  87	  AH	  ini7al	  SOC	  (ager	  the	  3	  planned	  tests)	  	  
–  10.6	  AH	  used	  per	  launch	  scrub	  
–  15.01	  AH	  used	  for	  worst	  case	  launch	  scenario	  
•  No	  change	  to	  baWery	  charging	  algorithm.	  If	  charging	  is	  required,	  discharge	  

















FT-­‐VMC	  Issues	  and	  Resolu>on	  
U20	  –	  CCA	  side	  
Pin A5 
U20	  Pin	  A5	  
CCA	  side	  	  
U20	  Pin	  A5	  
Device	  side	  	  
•  FT-­‐VMC	  BGA	  Black	  pad	  Issue	  	  (Risk	  #3941)	  
–  Black	  pad	  evidence	  on	  high	  vibra7on	  
failed	  test	  unit	  (unmodiﬁed	  rugged	  
chassis)	  in	  development	  tes7ng	  
–  Black	  pad	  phenomenon	  occurs	  when	  
the	  ball	  grid	  array	  on	  a	  device	  soldered	  
to	  the	  printed	  wire	  board	  fractures	  or	  
has	  debonded	  (open	  pads)	  
–  The	  root	  issue	  is	  anomalies	  in	  the	  
inter-­‐metallic	  bonds	  during	  the	  
manufacturing	  process.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  
weaken	  joint	  and	  poten7al	  premature	  
failure	  at	  these	  points	  
–  Industry	  phenomenon	  
–  Second	  test	  shows	  no	  black	  pad	  	  
–  Part	  is	  Altera	  Stra7x	  3	  FPGA	  





















Long (155 ft) Umbilical 
Short (25 ft) Umbilical 
with 7 connectors located 
at CM Umbilical plate 
Vehicle Interface Van (VIV) 






Mobile Operations Facility (MOF) 
Housing CCMS Back End 
4.5+  Miles Between 
MOF and VIV 
MOF at Cox Range 
Control Center 
Range Comm 





































Open	  Avionics	  Issues	  at	  T-­‐0	  
•  At	  T-­‐27d,	  Remote	  Interface	  Unit	  2	  (RIU2)	  failed	  to	  respond	  correctly	  on	  all	  
interfaces	  upon	  power	  up.	  
•  Telemetry	  (MDAU	  serial	  link)	  and	  VMC	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  unresponsive	  
•  Ethernet	  interface	  degraded	  (intermiWent	  ICMP	  response,	  no	  command	  
response)	  
•  Voltage	  and	  Currents	  were	  nominal	  
•  RIU1	  behaved	  nominally	  
–  Lab	  units	  never	  showed	  this	  behavior,	  even	  ager	  an	  aggressive	  power-­‐
cycle	  test	  (power	  cycled	  approx	  100	  7mes	  consecu7vely)	  
–  Project	  team	  elected	  not	  to	  aWempt	  the	  power	  cycle	  test	  on	  ﬂight	  units	  
to	  reduce	  risk	  of	  damage	  or	  further	  degrada7on.	  
–  Root	  cause	  has	  not	  been	  isolated.	  May	  be	  grounding	  problem.	  Power	  



















Open	  Avionics	  Issues	  at	  T-­‐0	  
•  SIGI2	  exhibited	  increasing	  drig	  in	  the	  posi7on	  solu7on	  throughout	  the	  
vehicle	  integra7on	  and	  system	  tes7ng	  phase.	  Requirement	  was	  “<	  0.6	  g/s”	  
–  Al7tude	  Go/No-­‐Go	  limits	  exceeded	  (-­‐41%	  margin),	  accepted	  as	  this	  is	  
not	  used	  by	  the	  GNC	  control	  loop	  
–  Drig	  error	  disappeared	  on	  Day	  of	  Flight	  
•  CM	  Main	  Vehicle	  BaWery	  1	  (MVB1)	  voltage	  was	  slow	  to	  recover	  following	  
brief	  (<	  1	  minute)	  load	  test	  at	  T-­‐24	  hours	  
–  Test	  and	  performance	  history	  of	  this	  baWery	  indicated	  that	  the	  
ac7va7on	  acceptance	  tes7ng	  at	  the	  manufacturer	  showed	  similar	  
behavior	  on	  this	  par7cular	  serial	  number.	  It	  was	  within	  acceptance	  


















Open	  EGSE	  Issues	  at	  T-­‐0	  
•  Vehicle	  Interface	  Unit	  ‘Voter	  Card’	  shorted	  intermiWently.	  
–  At	  T-­‐18d,	  rou7ne	  checks	  found	  that	  the	  CM	  skin	  had	  become	  energized	  
by	  the	  VIV	  ground	  reference.	  
–  Upon	  inves7ga7on,	  root	  cause	  found	  to	  be	  jack	  screw	  not	  installed	  
according	  to	  drawing	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  PCB	  conformal	  coa7ng.	  
–  Replaced	  failed	  board	  with	  spare.	  Inspected	  remaining	  8	  boards	  for	  
similar	  failures,	  replaced	  all	  post-­‐ﬂight.	  
16 
This	  washer	  should	  
have	  been	  installed	  
on	  the	  other	  side	  
Coa3ng	  failed,	  
energizing	  this	  screw	  



















Open	  EGSE	  Issues	  at	  T-­‐0	  
•  Command	  and	  Control	  Server	  failed	  to	  
enumerate	  RIUs	  correctly	  for	  the	  ﬁrst	  7me	  
at	  T-­‐2h25m	  
–  Prevented	  automa7c	  veriﬁca7on	  of	  
avionics	  built	  in	  test	  (cursory	  inspec7on	  
found	  no	  avionics	  problems)	  
–  Analyzed	  all	  the	  logﬁles	  available	  in	  real	  
7me	  using	  system	  experts	  in	  the	  Mission	  
Engineering	  Room	  and	  the	  engineering	  
teams	  standing	  by	  in	  Denver	  and	  Houston	  
–  At	  T-­‐39m,	  decided	  to	  reini7alize	  the	  EGSE	  
command	  server	  and	  rerun	  avionics	  built	  
in	  test	  to	  verify	  no	  avionics	  issues	  were	  
masked	  by	  the	  EGSE	  failure.	  
–  Had	  not	  happened	  before	  or	  since	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:05.032Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:05.032Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:05.032Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:05.032Z	  …	  Packet	  Type:	  	  17	  
-­‐-­‐	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.039Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.039Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.039Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.039Z	  …	  Packet	  Type:	  	  17	  
-­‐-­‐	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.071Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.071Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.071Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:17.071Z	  …	  Packet	  Type:	  	  17	  
-­‐-­‐	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:27.993Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:27.993Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:27.993Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:27.993Z	  …	  Packet	  Type:	  	  17	  
-­‐-­‐	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:28.031Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:28.031Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:28.031Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:28.031Z	  …	  Packet	  Type:	  	  17	  
-­‐-­‐	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:30.275Z	  …	  RIU1	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:30.275Z	  …	  COMMAND	  RESPONSE	  
2010-­‐05-­‐06T10:35:30.275Z	  …	  Msg	  Num:	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  










































































Avionics	  Flight	  data:	  Abort	  Enable	  

















Flight	  Data:	  PEC	  Channel	  Crosstalk	  
•  Due to PEC and MDAU design, erroneous telemetry can be recorded during ordnance 
firing events. When a channel is fired, PwrSpply indicates 0V and all channels firing 
•  Similar signature observed in EDL during validation testing with live NSIs 
•  This does not affect the performance of the PECs themselves, all ordnance did fire as 
designed (verified by post-flight continuity test) 
•  Had there been an anomaly, the lack of telemetry would impede troubleshooting 























Data	  Time	  Tagging	  
• Avionics	  design	  had	  no	  true	  7me	  reference;	  clocks	  were	  
synced	  to	  free-­‐running	  7me	  signal	  on	  board	  
• SIGI	  had	  no	  GPS.	  Would	  not	  have	  improved	  posi7on	  reckoning	  
during	  boost	  phase	  of	  PA-­‐1,	  
but	  could	  have	  provided	  an	  
accurate	  clock	  and	  reduced	  
drig	  errors	  prior	  to	  launch.	  
VIV	  had	  GPS	  7me	  reference,	  
but	  no	  IRIG	  signal	  to	  CM.	  
• WSMR	  data	  path	  included	  
an	  RF	  Best	  Source	  Selector.	  
Path	  delay	  is	  variable.	  
Product	   Time	  Oﬀset	  
MOF	  wideband	  recorded	  
telemetry	  
≡00:00:00.000	  
VIV	  logged	  data	  ﬁles	   +00:00:00.114±0.006	  
DFI	  recorder	  segment	  1	   -­‐04:22:37.873±0.005	  
DFI	  recorder	  segment	  2	   -­‐04:22:44.440±0.005	  
DFI	  recorder	  segment	  3	   -­‐04:22:53.415±0.005	  
OFI	  recorder	  segment	  1	   -­‐02:53:06.654±0.005	  
OFI	  recorder	  segment	  2	   -­‐02:53:12.533±0.005	  
OFI	  recorder	  segment	  3	   -­‐02:53:19.532±0.005	  
CM	  tunnel	  ﬁlm	  camera	   +11:20:54.963±0.006	  
CM	  tunnel	  video	  camera	   +12:34:53.680±0.032	  
WSMR	  op7cs	   +00:00:00.114±0.006	  
WSMR	  radar	   +00:00:00.114±0.006	  

















T-­‐0	  Cable	  Failure	  Post	  Launch	  
•  Abort	  motor	  blast	  
competed	  with	  vehicle	  
mo7on	  to	  demate	  
umbilical	  connectors	  
from	  the	  Crew	  Module.	  
•  Lanyards	  failed,	  although	  












































Conclusions	  /	  Lessons	  Learned	  
•  Avionics	  survived	  the	  ﬂight	  
–  SIGI2	  posi7on	  error	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  less	  than	  3	  g	  
–  RF	  Telemetry	  Link	  maintained	  lock	  via	  at	  least	  one	  receiver	  throughout	  
the	  ﬂight	  (best	  source	  selector	  switched	  as	  needed)	  
–  Parachute	  cuWers	  ﬁred	  successfully	  at	  T+8	  minutes	  
–  All	  transmiWers	  and	  auxiliary	  systems	  powered	  down	  as	  scheduled	  by	  T
+14	  minutes,	  VMCs	  and	  RIUs	  powered	  down	  when	  ground	  crew	  
removed	  the	  BaWery	  Enable	  Plugs.	  
–  Passed	  full	  suite	  of	  post-­‐ﬂight	  tests	  (func7onal	  checkout	  and	  mission	  
simula7ons)	  with	  no	  issues.	  
–  No	  evidence	  of	  BGA/Black	  Pad	  failure	  
•  Data	  7me	  tagging	  plan	  must	  account	  for	  en7re	  data	  path,	  should	  be	  
considered	  early	  so	  that	  post	  ﬂight	  analysis	  is	  prac7cal.	  Requirements	  must	  
be	  clear	  and	  understood	  
•  Launch	  schedule	  pressure	  can	  lead	  to	  sub-­‐op7mized	  solu7ons	  if	  decisions	  
are	  based	  on	  unrealis7c	  launch	  date	  (mid-­‐	  or	  long-­‐term	  solu7ons	  may	  be	  



































EGSE	  Flight	  Data	  
SCL:	  send	  command	  "abortexecute“	  
MSG:	  05/06/2010	  12:59:55:921	  Sending	  Command	  CGF01GV00010B	  -­‐	  VIU	  Pad	  Abort	  Execute	  	  	  
RTE:	  Task	  scriptid	  2881	  set	  to	  ONHOLD	  	  	  
RTE:	  Release	  HOLD	  on	  Task	  scriptid	  2881	  restore	  to	  COMPUTABLE	  	  	  
MSG:	  VIU1	  command	  accepted.	  MsgNum:	  659	  CmdId:	  1033	  	  	  
MSG:	  VIU3	  command	  accepted.	  MsgNum:	  659	  CmdId:	  1033	  	  	  
ALRT:	  Command	  Response	  Error	  	  	  
MSG:	  05/06/2010	  13:00:00:473	  System	  Mode	  Changing	  From	  (	  4	  )	  to	  (	  5	  )	  	  	  
ALRT:	  Abort	  heartbeat	  was	  turned	  off	  or	  lost,	  it	  is	  ok	  to	  re-­‐enable	  RIU	  cmding	  	  	  
MSG:	  05/06/2010	  13:00:02:171	  CMD	  Response	  Verified:	  VIU	  Pad	  Abort	  Execute	  	  	  
13:00:00.014[ericViuExec:ViuExec(241)]ViuExec	  processCcsCommand	  msgNum=659	  CmdId=1033	  Arg	  1=276	  Arg	  2=277	  Arg	  3=0	  
13:00:00.014[ericViuExec:MonCmdAbsStatus(400)]ViuExec,	  buildLocalCmd,	  pipename=/tmp/sendAbsPipe	  syncWord=64203	  cmdId=1	  
13:00:00.014[ericViuExec:MonCmdAbsStatus(422)]ViuExec,	  buildLocalCmd,	  pipename=/tmp/sendAbsPipe	  syncWord=64203	  cmdId=1	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(482)]viuCmdAbs	  readCmdIO	  -­‐	  cmdId	  1033,	  msgNum	  659,	  cmdval[0]276,	  cmdval[1]0	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(257)]viuCmdAbs	  sendToDiscreteDriver	  -­‐	  wrote	  a	  0,	  to	  dio	  brd	  num	  0,	  chan	  num	  	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(659)]viuCmdAbs	  readCmdIO	  -­‐	  Send	  stat	  to	  viuCmdEx	  -­‐	  num	  byte	  16,	  cmdId	  1033,c	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(482)]viuCmdAbs	  readCmdIO	  -­‐	  cmdId	  1033,	  msgNum	  659,	  cmdval[0]277,	  cmdval[1]0	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(257)]viuCmdAbs	  sendToDiscreteDriver	  -­‐	  wrote	  a	  0,	  to	  dio	  brd	  num	  1,	  chan	  num	  	  
13:00:00.014[ViuCmdAbsLog:EricAbstractCmd(659)]viuCmdAbs	  readCmdIO	  -­‐	  Send	  stat	  to	  viuCmdEx	  -­‐	  num	  byte	  16,	  cmdId	  1033,c	  
13:00:00.019[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30038K	  value	  1	  
13:00:00.019[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30050K	  value	  1	  
13:00:00.019[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30002V	  value	  1105568640	  
13:00:00.019[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30014V	  value	  1105528000	  
13:00:00.019[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30004D	  value	  1	  
13:00:00.019[Sequencer:Lcu(654)]Lcu::SetRuleFire,	  NORM,	  Fired	  rule	  1.10_Monitor_RIU1_Enable_Execute_On_Rule1.	  
13:00:00.019[Sequencer:Lcu(654)]Lcu::SetRuleFire,	  NORM,	  Fired	  rule	  1.11_Monitor_RIU2_Enable_Execute_On_Rule1.	  
13:00:00.019[ericViuExec:ViuExec(168)]ViuExec,	  main,	  From	  Cmd_Abs:	  Sync	  Word=64203	  CmdId=1033	  msgId=659	  Status=0	  
13:00:00.024[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30011D	  value	  0	  
13:00:00.024[ericTlmMgr:OmegaClient(206)]send	  tlm	  name:	  MGF01GV30010D	  value	  0	  
13:00:00.024[ericViuExec:ViuExec(168)]ViuExec,	  main,	  From	  Cmd_Abs:	  Sync	  Word=64203	  CmdId=1033	  msgId=659	  Status=0	  
13:00:00.024[ericViuExec:MonCmdAbsStatus(326)]ViuCmdEx	  commandSender	  Status	  to	  CCS:	  msgNum=659:	  cmdId=1033	  status=0	  
Command Log (Operator Station in the MOF): PA-1 Launch command 
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